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A Conversion to a Flourishing-Based Ethical Egoism: Discovering Morality’s
Prudential Rationality

Carson Johnston, University of Guelph

Abstract
How do we live a moral life while also living a life of value to us? A life filled with passions,
interests, and relationships? This paper tackles a possible reconciliation between morality and
rational prudence that ensures a moral way of life is valuable for the agent that lives it. The
author is motivated to build a moral theory that is “good for” the moral agent—an individual that
has a capacity to understand the moral value and impact of their actions in relation to others. It is
a theory that recognizes the human tendency to follow partial, self-interested, and typically
prudent ends. The reconciliation proposed in this paper has two dominant sources of influence.
The first is Gregory Kavka’s paper “A Reconciliation Project” (1984). The second is Lester
Hunt’s paper “Flourishing Egoism” (1999). After a discussion of their influence, the author
engages in an examination of ethical egoism that places it at the centre of the reconciliation
project. In this, several objections to ethical egoism are raised an answered considering a rule the
author names the gold-copper rule. Establishing a need to convert ethical egoism into a
flourishing-based egoism. It is through this notion of flourishing egoism and Kavka’s satisfaction
morality, where a reconciliation between morality and rational prudence is possible. One that can
properly capture the motivations of the moral agent given their nuanced psychology.
Introduction
It is common in ethics to establish ‘the moral agent’ as possessing a certain character
with respective qualifying traits and behaviours. An individual I believe has a capacity to
understand the moral value and impact of their actions in relation to others. However, I equally
believe that the moral agent is predominantly self-interested, posing an acute moral dilemma on
their ability to act morally during instances where moral scripts do not typically apply. That is,
the moral agent is at odds with their nuanced psychology, often following their desires, interests,
and remaining partial to certain people while striving to live a good and valuable life. Attempting
to pursue their self-interest (interest in the good of oneself for one’s own sake) and their ‘otherinterest’ (interest in the good of others, for their own sake). Some may refer to the latter as
altruism, but for coherency purposes altruism will be referred to hereafter as ‘other-interest’. It is
not the case, however; that an ethic ensures the plausibility of pursuing both. This is because
what we consider as morality and rational prudence have yet to be reconciled.1 Thus, in this
paper I strive to build a sufficient ethical theory that properly captures these competing
motivations by reconciling morality with rational prudence. Therefore, I propose that morality
and rational prudence are reconcilable upon the adoption of a flourishing-based ethical egoism;
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the plausibility of which rests on a theoretical tool for properly capturing the motivations of the
moral agent that I name the golden-copper rule.
Reconciliation & Flourishing Egoism
The reconciliation of morality and rational prudence proposed in this paper has two
dominant sources of influence. The first is Gregory Kavka’s paper “A Reconciliation Project”
(1984). The second is Lester Hunt’s paper “Flourishing Egoism” (1999). I will begin with a
discussion of the former, highlighting the key concepts that will carry forward into that of the
latter.
With such, Gregory Kavka in “A Reconciliation Project” (1984) saw morality and
rational prudence as reconcilable when ethical principles considered the likeliness that humans as
rational agents had some sense of self-control (to withhold acting on every desire) and a level of
emotional intelligence (recognizing emotions such as guilt and empathy) despite a tendency to
act self-interestedly. In other words, he saw humans as predominant egoists, recognizing that
while most of the time we will be inclined to follow our self-interest, there are instances in which
it is practically rational to be non-egoist.2
This serves as the basis for his reconciliation project of which Kavka provokes a
conception of morality that builds-in rational prudence. Motivating this project were the
problems Kavka saw as limiting Thomas Hobbes’ conception of moral motivation.3 Advocating
that the Hobbesian conception limits itself through a solely external sanctions-based approach
designed to combat Hobbes’ account of humans as psychological egoists.4 As such, by
considering humans as predominant egoists, Kavka was able to add the use of “internal
sanctions” as a means for reducing the likeliness of immoral behaviour.5 Saving, external
sanctions for those whom his argument does not convince.
Kavka, considered internal sanctions to be “built in constraints that are an important part
of socialization.” 6 He was adamant that if raised in a ‘normal’ social context, negative internal
sanctions (deep psychic distress) will follow from the thought of harming other people.7
Therefore, positive internal sanctions (deep psychic satisfaction) can be derived from morally
praiseworthy actions.8 From which, he built his conception of a “satisfaction morality”.
Kavka’s satisfaction morality suggests that it would be a primary goal for the moral agent
to be a genuinely moral individual.9 A genuinely moral individual is one who is aware of the
(relative) purity of their motives and the nature and depth of their commitment and uses this as a
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guide for their behaviour.10 The satisfactions of morality differ from other kinds of moral and
non-moral emotions. For instance, the deep pangs felt when we do something bad, and suggests
that feelings of pride or joy felt by someone lacking a constant devotion to the demands of
morality in one-off instances or seeming cases of morally praiseworthy behaviour are less than
the satisfactions felt by the genuinely moral individual. This illuminates a paradox of selfinterest. That is, being purely self-interested in the way often considered by moral philosophers,
will not always best serve one’s interests because certain substantial benefits accrue only to those
who are not purely self-interested. Those being, genuinely moral people. Implying that morality
is uniquely tied to advantage in a way that prudence is not.11 This also understands morality as
superior to immorality as a general policy from the viewpoint of rational prudence.12
With this, Kavka’s satisfaction morality and his consideration of the moral agent as a
predominant egoist carries forward into Lester Hunt’s flourishing egoism. Hunt’s flourishing
egoism is motivated towards an ethic that is good for the moral agent, stipulating that it is in an
individual’s self-interest to live a life oriented towards flourishing.13 For Hunt, “virtue and selfinterest suggest (given historical similarities) a further hypothesis: that there is some close
connection between the concept of virtue and that of self-interest” parentheses mine.14 From a
virtue-ethical standpoint, positive internal sanctions may be the undertones of flourishing or
eudaimonia that result in the habituation of moral actions; in which consistent and repeated
instances ought to occur. Implying an inherent relationship between moral action, positive
internal sanctions, and flourishing.
Consequently, Hunt’s flourishing egoism excludes the possibility of caring for another
for their own-sake (other-interest, or altruism) as something that too promotes the flourishing of
the moral agent, causing the moral agent to develop a metaphysical understanding of their self in
relation to others. Seeing others as extensions of their self and therefore, included within their
self-interest.15 Hunt uses this to claim that the individual can care for others; however, I do not
see this as a promotion of the other’s flourishing. Instead, it remains a promotion of the
individuals flourishing alone. Therefore, limiting the moral agent’s ability to be a genuinely
moral individual in the way Kavka subscribes to.
This problem encountered by Hunt is grounded in common criticisms against the theory
of ethical egoism. Ethical egoism is a self-interest led moral philosophy; therefore, it is an
attractive candidate for orienting our self-interest towards genuine morality. However, as
stipulated by James Rachels, “Ethical Egoism does not say that one should promote one’s own
interests as well as the interests of others.”16 Reasons being, that “Ethical Egoism is the radical
view that one’s only duty is to promote one’s own interests… and this principle sums up all of
10
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one’s natural duties and obligations.”17 Thus, the only instances where helping others is
necessary for the ethical egoist is when (1) “your interests coincide with the interests of others,
so that in helping yourself you will be aiding others willynilly”18. And (2) when “aiding others is
an effective means for creating some benefit for yourself.”19 Therefore, if the moral agent is a
predominant egoist, this is a barrier of ethical egoism that ought to be overcome if morality and
rational prudence are to be reconcilable. The next section will be devoted to a re-consideration of
ethical egoism given some of its major criticisms considering the golden-copper rule.
Ethical Egoism and Its Critics
I see ethical egoism as promoting an exclusionary pursuit of self-interest that encourages
the ethical egoist to engage in strategies such as Rawls’ maximin and Kavka’s disaster
avoidance. As well as entering mutually beneficial cooperative arrangements requiring a further
condition of honesty. The avoidance strategies disable a reactive attitude and encourages the
ethical egoist to consider immediate and long-term consequences of their actions. Entering
mutually beneficial cooperative arrangements require that the ethical egoist is trustworthy
because in so far as we require others to keep their promises and follow through on contracts,
others equally rely on us to do the same.20 As such, I see a true conception of ethical egoism as
relying on the following of a golden-copper rule:
Prospectively do good unto all others considering a probability that the others will do
unto you the same, but never when doing so is unilateral.
This rule will be used to answer the numerous objections against ethical egoism. The
culmination of this will ensure the plausibility of reconciling morality with rational prudence
through a flourishing-based ethical egoism that considers the moral agent to be a genuinely
moral individual in consideration of their nuanced psychology. Beginning with the criticism that
ethical egoism is self-contradictory.
As such, critics of ethical egoism initially deny it because they consider it to be selfcontradictory.21 These critics would claim that considering a probability that the others will do
unto you, posits a care for others that contradicts ethical egoisms’ exclusionary pursuit of selfinterest. This introduces the second criticism; that ethical egoism socially isolates the egoist.22
As for the former, ethical egoism avoids the criticism of self-contradiction when the
consideration of others doing unto you functions as a mode of ensuring a non-interference of
others, i.e., ensuring others do not detract from the ethical egoist’s ability to fulfill their selfinterest. This adheres to the first part of the rule: prospectively do good unto all others
considering a probability that the others will do unto you the same. For example, following the
speed limit on busy streets to ensure the safety of all drivers (and thereby you), considering the
probability that others will also drive the speed limit for the safety of all drivers. What this does
is solely isolate the egoist in terms of their motivation as opposed to a social separation from
17
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others. It is plausible then for the egoist to maintain meaningful connections with other people,
such as engaging in positive dialogue, generosity, and mutually beneficial cooperative
arrangements that in turn will limit the possibility of others directly or indirectly subtracting from
that which is in the ethical egoist’s self-interest.
But what happens in terms of conflicts of interest, i.e., situations in which an individual
gains from harming others and loses from not harming others?23 For example, competing for the
same job of which there is only one open position. This would surely be an instance in which the
ethical egoist ought to ensure a non-interference of others. Therefore, it seems prudentially
rational for the egoist to sabotage the other individual to get hired.
This is an instance in which it is necessary to re-consider ethical egoism in line with the
golden-copper rule, because while harming the other individual is prudentially rational, it is not
moral. Instead, the egoist ought to reason that it is more in their self-interest to be hired or not
hired on fair grounds because this will secure their ability to pursue their self-interest in the
future. Meaning, regardless of outcome, the benefit of engaging in moral behaviours is greater
than the cost of offensively violating moral structures. This goes alongside pursuing a noninterference of others and like the previous criticisms, a practical application of this involves the
instantiation of the golden-copper rule. It also reminds the ethical egoist that morality is superior
to immorality as a general policy from the viewpoint of rational prudence.24 However, it is this
latter criticism that motivates the conditional requirement in the rule: ceasing to do unto all
others when doing so is unilateral.
A such, a reconciliation of morality and rational prudence is at play when the moral agent
can successfully decipher when to prospectively do good unto all others, and when to not. This
requires understanding two additional concepts taken from Kavka. These pertain to offensive
violations; non-compliance when others are complying and defensive violations; reciprocated
non-compliance.25
Offensive violations are beneficial in retrospect and prospectively rational, however, they
are against the tenant of rational prudence.26 As it pertains to offensive violations, one may
choose to offensively violate a principle of cooperation under risk or under uncertainty. Choices
under risk occur when the agent has “reliable knowledge of the probabilities that the various
outcomes would follow the different available courses of action”27. Choices made under
uncertainty occur when this knowledge is unavailable. Therefore, rationality requires either a
maximin strategy: “choosing the action with the best worst outcome” or a disaster avoidance
strategy: “choosing the alternative that maximizes one’s chances of avoiding all unacceptable
outcomes.”28 Both strategies favour playing it safe, aiming at avoidance or minimization of
unacceptable outcomes. Thus, according to the two “safe-play” strategies, offensive violations
are irrational because the violator accepts unnecessary or greater than risk of suffering disastrous
23
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consequences.29 This suggest that an ethical egoist, in following the golden-copper rule is not
motivated to engage in offensive violations. It is often considered that because ethical egoism is
a self-interest led moral philosophy, that offensive violations become a part of ethical egoists
‘individual ethic’ however, understanding ethical egoism in this new sense, confirms that
participation in offensive violations is against the core tenants of ethical egoism.
Here lies a coincidence between morality and rational prudence: rational prudence
dismisses a strategy of “clever compromise” between moral and immoral conduct under the rule:
“follow the moral rules except when you believe (or confidently believe) you can get away with
violating them” because this makes one likely to experience the consequences of offensive
violations.30 In this way, offensive violations are not prudent. Instead, the ethical egoist
subsumes the golden-copper rule, in which they follow the rules to avoid an unnecessary or
greater than risk of suffering disastrous consequences.31
Defensive violations then, can be considered as reciprocated non-compliance, in-line
with moral duty. Defensive violations occur in the absence of reciprocated restraint. This can be
understood by Kavka’s copper rule: “do unto others as they do unto you” (founded in a principal
of cooperation and reciprocation).32 The golden-copper rule follows from this with a prospective
as opposed to reactive doing unto others like the timeless golden rule but provides an escape
clause when it is known that others are not complying securing a freedom for the ethical egoist to
ensure a moral non-interference of others. For example, exposing your opponent for trying to
sabotage you from getting hired for the job that they are also attempting to get.
With this, Kavka stands between Rawls and Gauthier.33 In line with Rawls, Kavka’s
disaster avoidance strategy is like the maximin principle used under a veil of ignorance.34 On the
other hand, Kavka grounds his predominant egoism is sociobiology. Gauthier evaluated the
rational actor as an “economic man” understanding personal characteristics that sway action.35
As such, Kavka also considers personal characteristics in recognizing a kind of egoism
influencing practical rationality; however, he uses sociobiology to reject psychological egoism.36
This builds his argument for humans as “predominant egoists”. Recognizing that there are
instances in which it is practically rational to be non-egoist.37
However, regardless of if Kavka is correct to assume that our evolution pre-supposes an
attitude that we should help others only if they promise to and do reciprocate. I beg to argue that
it would be irrational to sustain cooperation when it is not reciprocated. This seems to be a
negative reason against abandoning moral structures when an individual’s survival, security,
and/or well-being is at stake. Instances that do not implicate these three factors could argue for
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why one may choose a unilateral following of moral structures. However, it would not be
immoral for someone to prioritize their self-interest when others do not follow.
Consequently, there is a fourth criticism against ethical egoism, limiting the potential for
the ethical egoist to be a genuinely moral individual. That is, critics of ethical egoism often
believe that doing good unto all others considering a probability that others will do unto you the
same, fosters a manipulative attitude towards others in attempt to avoid certain sacrifices often
required by morality.38 For example, one may elect to babysit their friend’s dog to receive some
future favor from their friend. While not inherently unethical, as this could be considered a
mutually beneficial cooperative arrangement, critics of ethical egoism purport that only viewing
others as of worth when one is in a mutually beneficial cooperative arrangement with another is
ingenuine and therefore, does not constitute caring for others for their own sake. This is because
caring for another for their own sake often requires making certain sacrifices, such as not
receiving a returned favour, and according to the critics, this is something that cannot be in one’s
self-interest.
In response, ethical egoism avoids this problem under a proper consideration of
cooperation. As stated by Robert Shaver, it is not merely enough that the ethical egoist acts as if
others have weight, the ethical egoist must genuinely give them weight.39 By weight, Shaver can
be understood as referring to moral worth or respect. Therefore, it is not enough that the ethical
egoist appears to care for others to receive some self-interested end. They must genuinely care
for and regard the well-being of others as an end in itself. Thus, standing by the rule that the
moral agent must be a genuinely moral individual.
Furthermore, a manipulative attitude can easily backfire for the ethical egoist if not
properly concealed. Hunt explains that:
“If people were to realize that I act as if I value their well-being simply in order to get
something out of them, all sorts of results that are bad for me will tend to follow: to one
extent or another, other people will object to being “used” in this way and will refuse to
cooperate with me. They will also dislike me, and they will think I am a bad person.”40
As such, it is rational for the ethical egoist to reason that it is good for them that others are
cooperative, like them, and think they are a good person; “thus, to the extent that these results
can be expected to follow from it, egoistic behavior undermines the aim of egoism.”41
Furthermore, if Kavka is correct that we are in fact predominant egoists then this would be an
instance in which it is prudentially rational to be non-egoist.
Critics of this claim will assert that it merely replaces a manipulative attitude with a selfdefeating attitude.42 This self-defeating attitude in turn, further proves that ethical egoism is selfHunt, “Flourishing Egoism,” 182-183.
Shaver, Robert. "Egoism". In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), edited by Edward
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40
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contradictory.43 However, Hunt asserts that this is not additional proof for a contradiction of
ethical egoism.44 In so far as ethical egoism does not contradict itself by securing a care for
others as a mode of non-interference, it also deems that we genuinely should have these otherregarding behaviours and attitudes. Therefore, Hunt reveals that “egoism would (according to
itself) give the true account of why we ought to do and believe these things.”45
The next test of this solution would then be to apply it to cases of caring for others of
whom we have varying kinds of relationships with. As such, if our moral agent is an ethical
egoist, to help others, they must have a certain level of care for others. Following the philosophy
of Ayn Rand, as it pertains to individuals that the moral agent has special relationships with
(marked by friendship, love, or mutually beneficial arrangements) helping these others does not
require a sacrifice of self-interest because sacrifice “is the surrender of a greater value for the
sake of a lesser one or of a non-value.”46 Individuals that the moral agent has special
relationships with have value to the moral agent. Therefore, the moral agent has a certain level of
care for these people.
Apart from individuals the moral agent has special relationships with, Kavka would
suggest that the moral agent adheres to the copper rule. However, this is insufficient in that this
applies to some others and not all others. As such, considering ethical egoism as the instantiation
of a golden-copper rule—prospectively do good unto all others considering a probability that the
others will do unto you the same, but never when doing so is unilateral—the ethical egoist can
and will care for all others. Only when ethical egoism is interpreted by a golden-copper rule, can
it be explained why the ethical egoist will sometimes act as a non-egoist to help all others and
why this is consistent with the philosophy of ethical egoism. At this juncture it can be made
evident that “all others” means “all moral others” and does not apply to immoral individuals.
Based on the above argument, it would not be the case that moral structures under this rule
would require the moral agent to sacrifice their self-interest at the hand of the immoral and that
this is a morally responsible action.
Reconciliation
In essence, our re-consideration of ethical egoism, brings us to an alternative
understanding of morality, i.e., that which captures morality’s prudential rationality as inspired
by Kavka and Hunt. However, additionally sees to it that such an ethic recognizes what it means
to be human today, in line with our complicated and biased psychology. It understands that we
will often act morally because it secures two competing motivations: it serves that which feeds
our well-being, and it also serves that which is necessary for living a meaningful life with others.
Living a meaningful life with others is exactly this notion of caring for others for their own sake,
recognizing their worth in virtue of being humans. Thus, although in most cases we will be
inclined to follow our self-interest, it is also possible for us to recognize that forgoing our selfinterest is not a loss. Rather, it is an essential part of morality and is therefore, a critical
constituent of our flourishing. However, it is only prudentially rational if others are participating
43
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along this same scheme. Thus, in moments where individuals violate codes of morality, threaten
our individual well-being, and where moral scripts do not typically apply, it is through exercising
rational prudence that we can secure our individual possibilities of living a meaningful and moral
life. Therefore, a flourishing-based ethical egoism is merely that which says morality ought to be
in our self-interest and lets us discover morality’s prudential rationality; stating that we ought to
prospectively do good unto all others considering a probability that the others will do unto you
the same, but never when doing so is unilateral.
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